Board of inquiry 1939
From the middle thirties it had become more and more apparent that the Garrison Institutes were not functioning efficiently.
Liabilities steadily increased without an increase in trade. This situation drifted throughout the 1930s; and was only brought to halt during the Second World War. A clean up of the UDFl was urgently required as the Union Defence Force required a canteen organisation to supply South African troops in overseas theatres with basic necessities. The civilian financial team at the Defence Secretariat -always wary of their difficult relationship with the uniformed members of the Union Defence Force under the leadership of the vainglorious Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Pierre van Ryneveldwould seize the opportunity to vocalise their criticism of the military's management of the institutes.
This was not going to be easy. Van Ryneveld, knighted after his epic flight from London to Cape Town in 1920/ completely dominated the war period in South Africa. His unorthodox and autocratic style of centralised command,4 for instance, "enabled him to control every aspect of Defence down to the lowest levels ... [h)is forceful personality dominated all about him while his monumental memory for detail enabled him to dictate at levels not usually associated with his exalted position."s He furthermore clearly distinguished between the Union Defence Force and the Department of Defence, and this inevitably placed him in constant collision with the Secretary for Defence. Many colleagues and associates, including the British admiral at Simonstown, experienced similar difficulties when dealing with Van Ryneveld: but then at the time the Royal Navy seemingly had difficulty in dealing with most South Africans. 6 In consequence, relations between Van Ryneveld and the Secretary for Defence, Brigadier General C.H. Blaine, were never easy and this disrupted the smooth working of the Department; particularly as Van Ryneveld could always fall back on the authority of his mentor, General J.C. Smuts, who was both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. 7 The task of exercising supervision over the management committees and drawing the attention of the Minister of Defence to any mismanagement within the UDFI, fell to the Board of Control.
8 At the request of this body, a Board of Inquiry was appointed by the Secretary for Defence in December 1939, to investigate the activities of the UDFI, and in particular the POI, and "make representations regarding any changes that may be considered necessary to ensure the achievement of the purpose for which Garrison Institutes are authorized.,,9 The basic purpose of the UDFI, the cheap and expeditious provision of basic necessities to the serving soldier, was not being done for some time.
After a month of investigation, the three-man commission submitted a report to the Secretary for Defence detailing a number of irregularities. The commission found that the Board of Control did not exercise proper supervision over the management committees enabling the PGI Management Committee to contract overdrafts, on various occasions, without the approval of the Board of Control and without making provisions for the new liabilities.
Furthermore, both Garrison Institutes were guilty of making staff changes and additions (a clear indication that nepotism was still taking place) without reference to the Board of Control; and quarterly and annual reports were not being submitted by the general manager or his sectional managers. IO The PGI Management Committee was composed entirely of military members, whose service was hampered by frequent transfers and a definite lack of financial experience; and, to worsen matters, the military members on the Board of Control outnumbered the civilians by two to one (the Financial Under Secretary). I I The Board of Inquiry's recommendation that the Secretary for Defence, as administrative head of the department, be a member and chairman of the Board of Control and that at least one civilian member, conversant in financial and commercial matters, be appointed to the Management Committee of the PGI -was ignored by the Board of Control. 12 The military members of the latter body -Van Ryneveld and the Adjutant General, Major General H.S. Wakefield -were clearly unwilling to lose control to the Defence Secretariat, the civilian holders of the Defence Department's purse strings. Brigadier General C.H. Blaine, who became Secretary for Defence in 1939 after being transferred from the Department of Justice, held the ex officio rank of brigadier general in his capacity as the commanding officer of the Essential Services Corps but to all intents and purposes must be classed as a civilian. 13 This was all anathema to the military members who believed the parlance that an officer could do absolutely anything. The commission further found that the cash position reflected a shortage of liquid resources and a loan of £ 10 000 was suggested to enable the Institute to settle accounts promptly and thus obtain every possible discount: impatient creditors would also not want to deal with the UDFI in the future. The report also stressed that the object of the PGI was to keep profits at the minimum; and that the management had not done enough to ensure the financial security of the Institutes. The payment of rebates should have been restricted until a strong cash reserve had been created; while all available funds should have been sunk into the repayment of loans. There was a basic problem here. The management did not see the initial debt of £11 767 to the UDFI Trust Fund as a loan which had to be repaid: it had not been defined as such and no interest was paid thereon. 14 The physical condition of the premises of the PGI in Voortrekkerhoogte, was also inadequate and the commission suggested that the Department of Defence provide suitable accommodation. The storage of bulk stores was found to be chaotic and it was recommended that a separate bulk store be erected to ensure more effective control: shrinkage would seem to have become a problem. The staff, furthermore, could obtain goods for cash at cost price, plus 5%. The commission found this to be too beneficial and recommended that all sales to the staff be charged to their account at selling price, less 10%. A coupon or disc system was also recommended for small purchases; and it was suggested that petrol be sold for cash only. IS By October 1941, the Board of Control's apathy to the recommendations was indisputable.
Few of the recommendations were acted upon and on the more important issues, no action appears to have taken place at all. Of the fourteen key recommendations only four were implemented, two were partly complied with, and eight were completely ignored. The recommendations regarding management and control, were anathema to the military officers; particularly the Chief of the General Staff, Van Ryneveld, who had very definite ideas and was not open to innovative suggestions implying that a military man was not the equal of any civilian.
As a result, the fluctuations in gross profit continued unabated; and the net profit on trading for the PGI over the period ended I March 1941, stood at the absurdly low figure of2,5%. In the opinion of Mr D. Burke, Secretary to the Board of Inquiry, if rent alone was paid by the PGI at regular Pretoria rates, the Institute would not have survived. In view of the apparent reluctance of the Board of Control to assume its supervisory responsibility over the Garrison Institutes, Burke suggested that the Secretary for Defence consider the desirability of sending a report to the Minister of Defence. 16 In terms of the UDFI constitution, this task fell to the Board of Control and not the Secretary for Defence. I7 The Defence Legal Adviser accordingly warned Blaine not to get involved with the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Inquiry, unless the civilian side of the Department of Defence obtained control of the Board of Control and the two Management Committees.
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That is, not until the implementation of the recommendation appointing the Secretary for Defence as chairman of the Board of Control, so increasing the civilian element on the board to two members. Should Blaine have facilitated a full implementation of the proposals it would have confirmed, in the minds of the soldiers, the idea that their civilian colleagues were wanting control of the UDFI and the displacement of the Chief of the General Staff as chairman of the Board of Control.
Following the advice of the Defence Legal Adviser, Blaine referred the matter to the Board of Control, \9 who simply resolved to "hold over the DC minute for consideration at a later date;,,20 while the same meeting -in direct opposition to the recommendations -approved rebates of 7% and 7,5% on paid customer accounts at the PGI and CPGI respectively: done in an attempt to maintain the goodwill of the customers. After a lapse of two years, the Board merely recorded "thatjt was too late to examine the report in detail,,2\ and the report of the Board ofInquiry was shelved with no material action taken on any of the recommendations.
Statutory privilege
In an attempt to increase profit, the PGI contravened certain of the regulations governing the trading of the Institutes and faced prosecution in 1942. The Board of Control sought a quick-fix and consequently requested the promulgation of a special war measure enabling the Garrison Institutes to trade with civilians -as the UDFI had done in South West Africa during the First World War -and exempt the institutes from the provisions of the Weights and Measures Act, the Shop Hours Ordinance and the Wage Determination Act. This was hardly the same. During the First World War, the UDFI had brought real benefit to the people of South West Africa, who would otherwise had been exploited by one or two traders. The PGI of 1942, on the other hand, was a small, old-fashioned, mismanaged shopping organisation only managing to keep its head above water by the patronage of the all-powerful Chief of the General Staff, who chaired its Board of Control.
It is not surprising that the Board of Control's request did not meet with the support of Defence Secretary Blaine, who believed that the existing privileges enjoyed by the Garrison Institutes, freeing them from the payment of licences, taxes, duties and fees 22 already placed the Institutes in a position to undersell ordinary civilian establishments.
Blaine deemed the extension of these already considerable privileges most unwise as the acts concerned protected the customers and staff 23 of the Garrison Institutes and any promulgation exempting the Institutes from their effect would not be a good example to non-government institutions.
Having decided to oppose the promulgation of the war measure, Blaine found himself -in the words of his deputy -in the "slightly awkward (position) to refuse the request made by the Board ofContro!.,,24
Blaine sought the counsel of the Financial Adviser, E.H. Lewis, who suggested a compromise with the other departments concerned and so avoid the publication of the war measure. 25 Eventually, after a year of confrontation, an agreement was reached in December 1943. The Board of Control conceded their request for the statutory exemptions in exchange for the legalisation of the civilian trade, limited to certain groups: but as determined by the Board of Contro!. The draft measure had stipulated that the civilian trade was to be conducted at the discretion of the Secretary for Defence but Blaine had to concede this point toO. 26
Financial position of the PGI 1944-1945
In 1944, the 'Pretoria Garrison Institute was on the verge of bankruptcy. The balance sheet for the year ended 26 August 1944 reflected a sundry debtors account of £45 558, of which £20 100 was classed as bad or doubtful debt -something which was not disclosed to the Assistant Secretary Financial at capital to speak of and was financed at the expense of its creditors -current liabilities exceeding the floating assets to the tune of £4,002.12.1. 31
Fiscal dispute
During the closing years of the war, a situation developed which sharpened the feeling between the civil and military elements in the Department of Defence, evoked the disgust of a previous member of the Board of Control -E.H. Lewis, who had been Financial Under Secretary in the Department of Defence -and induced the resignation of the Assistant Secretary (Financial) from the Board of Control.
In 1945, the Management Committee of the POI applied for an additional loan of £10,000 from the UDFI Trust Fund, so as to provide additional working capital for the payment of the creditors' account: then four months in arrears.
32 Anticipating the division on the Board of Trustees, the Board of Control advanced the request with a recommendation that only £5 000 be considered for the loan. However, their precaution did not diminish the disparagement of the civilian members on the Board of Trustees. Existing loans to the POI and the CPOI already amounted to £28 471.1.1 and £2 768.14.3 respectively, leaving approximately £12 000 in the Trust Fund, of which £5000 was earmarked as security for the POI's overdraft. 33
Patterson was prepared to recommend a loan of five thousand pounds at 4% interest provided "that the rebate to customers out of the current year's profits after allowing for the usual staff bonus and donations will not exceed 5% unless the payment of the suppliers accounts is up to date.',34 Patterson had also insisted on these conditions when the POI Management Committee had approached the Board in 1944 for a loan of nine hundred pounds for alterations and improvements to the PGI building at Defence Headquarters, Pretoria. He believed that the PGI, in view of its large profit, should have been able to finance building projects and build up a cash reserve from its own resources -something any similar trading concern would have had to dO. fifth trustee, the "non-aligned" member of the Defence Council, however, normally voted with the civilian element.
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Patterson attributed the Institute's growing debt to the custom of disposing of all of the profits in the form of either grants or rebates to customers. E.H. Lewis, summoned before the 1939 Board of Inquiry, too declared that profits ought to have been ploughed back into the business and not distributed exclusively to the benefit of customers. Dissatisfaction had arisen among the men in the Pretoria and Roberts Heights garrisons, who were under the impression that the cost of extra trading facilities were to be met from capital and not from the profits which they had helped generate. This, as Lewis explained to the Board of Inquiry, was an anomaly as the men who complained had little .to do with the initial build.-up of capital then vested in the UDFI Trust Fund. This money was largely obtained from the members of the Union Defence Forces who had supported the old SAGI during the First World War.37
Furthermore, a precedent for distributing all of the profits produced by the UDFI and its predecessor, the SAGI, did not exist. In 1902, Lord Kitchener had ordered the erection of the stone and brick garrison institute building at Roberts Heights from the profit that the SAGI had produced during the Second Anglo-Boer War; and, in 1921, the UDFI Trust Fund was established from the profits the UDFI had made during the First World War. During the first years of the PGI's existence, additional buildings were erected and a dairy and butchery were added to the business of the Institute by virtue of the Management Committee adopting a policy of not distributinM all of the profits, but rather using them to extend the business of the Institutes.
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Van Ryneveld, on the other hand, maintained that the UDFI Trust Fund was there precisely for the purpose of financing the Garrison Institutes and was even prepared to realise some of the Trust Fund's fixed securities in order to provide the £5 000 required by the PGI. Patterson was the only civilian sitting on the Board of Control, where he was continually opposed by the military members of the Board, even concerning financial matters (on which he was the expert), and when it came to a show of hands he was continually outvoted. On at least one occasion information regarding the PGI debtors account was withheld from him, while on another he had insisted that his vote against the allowing of the rebate be recorded in the minutes. Patterson was now the second civilian member of the Department of Defence having financial grounding, to disclaim the want of having anything to do with the UDFI: Lewis had done so in September 1939 on the eve of the Board of Inquiry.
Blaine, now forced to act, informed the members of the Board of Trustees that "in view of the unsatisfactory financial position of the POI ... [he was] unable to agree to the loan asked for until the affairs of the Institution have been put in order, and the management should be advised to take immediate steps to effect the necessary improvements.',43 Blaine was not authorised to approach the Minister of Defence or the Management Committees directly when dealing with Institute matters. However, in July 1945, at variance with the dilatory behaviour of the Board of Control and contrary to the advice received from the Defence Legal Adviser in 1941, he drafted a minute to the Minister of Defence in which he gave a detailed exposition of the financial problems of the Garrison Institutes and the UDFI Trust Fund. The Secret~ry blatantly laid "the responsibility for the state of affairs ... with the Board of Control for as regards the granting of rebates to customers and donations out of profits, it appears to have disregarded the recommendations of the Management Committee and also of the auditors and ignored the auditor's recommendations for the increase of reserves and the provision of sufficient working capital."
He suggested that "a direction as to the future policy to be followed in the matter of strengthening the cash members of the Defence Secretariat to reconcile themselves with the fact that they, as civilian members of the department, were not permitted to share in the benefits offered by the Institutes to their military counterparts. 51 This seems something of an oversimplification.
Lieutenant General Sir Pierre van Ryneveld's autocratic control and inability to delegate, coupled to the vetoing of individual initiative, inevitably led to the making of ill-considered management decisions: perhaps few more ill-considered than those relating to the Pretoria Garrison Institutes. According to the official historians, Van Ryneveld did not learn good-management lessons of any kind during the war and continued his unique leadership and management style in the post-war Union Defence Force until unseated, for political reasons, by the National Party government. 
